Reserve decided to act against inflation, the twelve month moving average rate of cpi increase was above 4.5 percent and rising. It was not sustained below 3 percent until 1983. Edward Nelson (2003) has an excellent summary and critique of several explanations of the Great Inflation. These include the Federal Reserve's failure to raise interest rates enough to maintain positive real rates, mismeasurement of the output gap with the result that the inflation rate remained persistently above the forecast, and belief in a long-run tradeoff that lowered the unemployment rate especially for minorities. Romer and Romer (2002) However, two central beliefs changed when Paul Volcker became chairman. Volcker insisted on independence from administration interference, and he changed the weights that the FOMC gave to inflation and unemployment. He allowed the unemployment rate to rise above 10 percent, the highest rate in the postwar period and, no less important, he did not ease policy despite an unemployment rate between 7 and 10 percent for 28 months. Independence kept him from coordinating policy. The historically high fiscal deficits of the early Reagan years had to be financed in the debt markets. Giving most weight to inflation, despite high unemployment, eventually convinced the public that the Federal Reserve would succeed in permanently reducing the inflation rate.
Why Inflation Started
Disinflation in or to free reserves. Occasionally, the directive mentioned the Treasury bill rate and later the federal funds rate. No one attempted to reconcile the various measures or targets; the account manager had considerable discretion.
The interpretation of interest rates and money market conditions encouraged pro-cyclical policy. The FOMC interpreted relatively low nominal interest rates as evidence of monetary ease, despite falling or slow growth of money and credit. This was the same error the System had made in the Great Depression. Its consequence was that the System permitted money growth to fall in recessions and rise excessively in expansions.
Chairman Martin never tried systematically to relate current decisions or actions to longer-term influences on output, employment, and prices. When Sherman Maisel and others expressed concern about the vague language of the directive to the manager, he appointed a Committee on the Directive but maintained his short-term focus on the money market. To the extent that Martin had a theory of inflation, inflation was caused by budget deficits. This was a widely held view. It isn't hard to see the basis of that belief; most inflation in the United States had occurred in wartime, when the government ran a budget deficit. It was the deficit, not its financing that mattered. And, like most practical people who held this view, he did not relate the deficit to the interest rate and the rate of money growth.
Martin was especially concerned about deficit finance in 1965, when President Johnson increased spending for the Great Society and the Vietnam War. Johnson kept the spending and projected deficit secret until the budget message in January 1966, but Martin had his own sources and learned early that the 1966 deficit would increase substantially. He could not convince the president of the need for higher interest rates. Out of concern for coordination, he delayed the increase until December. In a 4 to 3 vote, the Board increased the discount rate in December 1965.
6
Delay was Martin's first mistake. The next mistake was more important. After raising the discount rate, monetary policy became more expansive. Annual growth of the monetary base increased to 6 percent.
Sherman Maisel described what happened.
"Most of those who had voted for the discount rate increase then spent the period through June holding that the amount of restriction applied should be minor and should be increased only gradually. On the other hand, those who had voted against the discount rate increase … now became hawks." (Maisel Diary, FOMC Summary, February 9, 1967, 3) Misled by the decline in free reserves and a modest increase in interest rates, the majority ignored rising money growth. By summer 1966, 12 month cpi inflation reached 3.5 percent, a rate then considered highly inflationary. The Great Inflation was underway.
Why Inflation Continued
The Federal Reserve tried several times to reduce or end inflation. Each time, it reversed direction when unemployment rose or real activity faltered. In part, this was based on a political judgment that the public, the Congress, or the administration would not accept the temporary increase in unemployment necessary to bring a permanent reduction in inflation. James Tobin and many other economists argued that the social costs of unemployment greatly outweighed the social cost of inflation. In Tobin's words, "many Harberger triangles fit in an Okun gap." This misstates the issue, first, by ignoring many costs of inflation such as non-indexed tax and depreciation rates but also by neglecting that the increased unemployment is temporary but lower inflation persists.
The error that was more important for policymaking came from the Phillips curve.
Arthur Okun, CEA chairman at the end of the Johnson administration, was clear. He thought that policy had moved down the Phillips curve. He thought the 1968 tax surcharge would induce a reversal. He recognized Friedman's (1968) argument that the long-run Phillips curve was vertical, but he dismissed it as having limited practical relevance. Later, he recognized that the economy had not moved back along the Phillips curve. Too late, he realized that ending inflation would be costly.
7
Economists in the Nixon administration accepted Friedman's (1968) natural rate argument and accepted also that inflation resulted from excessive money growth. What they didn't accept was that ending inflation would require more than the 4.5 percent unemployment rate that they were willing to accept. Their principal, President Nixon, had promised to end inflation without a recession. Although his advisers told him that was wrong, he did not change his fundamental belief that no one lost an election because of inflation; elections were lost because of unemployment. His decision to impose price and wage controls was a political decision, a decision to expand the economy in time for the 1972 election while hiding any inflationary consequences. And it worked for him. Inflation did not start to increase until after the 1972 election, and the unemployment rate fell to 5.6 percent in the month before the election from 6.1 percent in the month that controls began.
The economy then experienced a series of large shocks to oil and food prices that carried Economists have offered several reasons for continued inflation. I accept that many of them are correct partially. None explain why it took 15 years to correct these mistakes. The inflation rate was available at every meeting; FOMC members knew that over time inflation and the unemployment rate increased together, contrary to the Phillips curve. Many of the FOMC members were practical men, not attached to any theory.
After he left the Federal Reserve, Arthur Burns gave a cogent explanation of the persistence of inflation in his Per Jacobsson lecture to the 1979 IMF-World Bank meeting.
Burns described the "anguish" of central bankers. By training and disposition they opposed inflation. "Despite their antipathy to inflation and the powerful weapons they could wield against it, central bankers have failed … utterly in this mission in recent years." (Burns, 1987, 688) Burns gave his usual explanations. The public believed that the Employment Act of 1946 committed the government to prevent unemployment, and the welfare system made them look to 8 government for assistance. In Burns words, "many Americans came to believe that all of the new or newly discovered ills of society should be addressed promptly by the federal government" (ibid., 690). This led to unbalanced budgets, increased regulation, and other ways of increasing production costs.
Burns expressed the two main reasons for persistent inflation: policy errors and the relative weights that the public, Congress, and most administrations gave to unemployment and inflation. The first includes mistaken theories of inflation; the second is a political argument.
Here is Burns's summary.
"'Maximum' or 'full' employment, after all, had become the nation's economic goalnot stability of the price level. … Fear of immediate unemployment -rather than fear of current or eventual inflation -thus came to dominate economic policymaking" (ibid., 691).
Central banks were not helpless, Burns said. "Viewed in the abstract, the Federal
Reserve had the power to abort the inflation at its incipient stage fifteen years ago or at any later point, and it has the power to end it today. At any time within that period, it could have restricted the money supply and created sufficient strains in financial and industrial markets to terminate inflation with little delay. It did not do so because the Federal Reserve was itself caught up in the philosophic and political currents that were transforming American life and culture" (ibid., 692).
My reading of the detailed record finds strong support for both claims, policy error and political concerns. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Federal Reserve ignored or denied the role of money growth for inflation, did not distinguish between real and nominal interest rates, continued pro-cyclical policies, and used a backward looking Phillips curve that the members believed permitted inflation to bring a permanent gain in employment. When oil and food prices rose in the 1970s, it did not distinguish between one-time, possibly permanent, increases in the price level and sustained inflation driven by sustained excess money growth. The former produces a temporary increase in the rate of price change; the latter causes a persistent increase in the rate of price change. The former arises because of reduced supply, the latter because of increased demand. Reducing demand following a reduction in supply reduces output. Monetary policy can not compensate for a reduction in oil or a temporary loss of the Mississippi harbor and waterway.
During the Great Inflation, the Federal Reserve also held the view that more than a modest increase in unemployment, even if temporary, was unacceptable as a way of reducing inflation. As Burns said, in principle the Federal Reserve could have slowed money growth to end inflation at any time. In practice, it reduced its independence by acceding to the fashion that interpreted the Employment Act as giving greatest weight to unemployment and lesser weight to inflation.
Why Inflation Ended
Several changes regard this as largely a smoke screen. They didn't do it, and although they several times considered changes in operating procedures to improve control of money, they did not adopt them. The staff favored the changes. Volcker and the FOMC did not.
Courage and conviction matter. Paul Volcker was present when Arthur Burns gave the Per Jacobsson lecture to explain why he, and others, had been unable politically to end inflation.
Volcker had already decided to do what Burns said was politically infeasible. He left the IMF meeting to implement the anti-inflation policy. He informed President Carter and his economic advisers. Although some had reservations, they did not object to the decision.
The main change was in the weights assigned to unemployment and inflation. Volcker and a majority of his colleagues were willing to accept unprecedented increases in interest rates and a long period of high unemployment. The unemployment rate remained above 7.5 percent for more than 50 months, long after the economy began to recover. Long-term nominal interest rates remained above 10 percent until November 1985, long after the inflation had fallen to 3 or 4 percent.
The market was slow to believe that high inflation had ended and that political pressures to reduce the unemployment rate more quickly would not once again abort the policy and bring another rise in inflation.
Disinflation did not require sophisticated economic theory or careful implementation, and it did not have them. It required enough persistence to convince the public that high inflation would not return. And it required political and public support for the transitional effects on unemployment, homebuilding and other durable assets. Volcker and most of his colleagues supplied the persistence. The public, members of Congress, and two presidents provided the political support.
Why Inflation Did Not Return
The Great Inflation and the disinflation taught many lessons, many of them old and forgotten until the 1980s. Central banks, including the Federal Reserve put more weight on the cost of inflation and less weight on the costs of temporary increase in unemployment than they had in the 1960s and 1970s. There are several reasons.
Research showed that the costs of inflation included much more than the additional trips to the bank highlighted in traditional analysis. (Fischer, 1981) Central banks learned that disinflation was costly and painful for society and for them. The 1960s idea that a free market economy could not achieve full employment and low inflation without guideposts or other forms of interference with wages and prices disappeared. The new mantra was that inflation reduced information about changes in relative prices, hindered efficient resource allocation, and slowed investment and growth. Beginning in New Zealand, but followed by many other countries, central banks adopted rules for monetary policy such as inflation targets.
Central bank economists, and most other economists, are more aware of the role of information and the interaction between their statements and actions and market responses. Of course, we still have to get many central banks, including ours, to believe that excessive money growth produces sustained inflation and to give more weight to medium-term effects of their actions letting markets smooth out short-term fluctuations. One place to begin currently would be a clearer distinction between price level changes and sustained rates of change.
